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Foreword 
After I had completed and handed in this thesis the judgement in the case C-
210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-000 was delivered. I 
had predicted the judgement in the case to be different and since great parts 
of the thesis, foremost the analysis and conclusion depended on the 
predicted outcome of the case I decided to add an appendix where the 
judgement is discussed.  
 
However, I am of the opinion that re-incorporation will become possible 
within a foreseeable future and therefore, as part of the main focus of the 
thesis is what consequences might follow from making re-incorporation 
possible, this thesis is still of relevance.  
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Summary 
Nationals of Member States, including companies and firms that are formed 
in accordance with the laws of a Member State, are granted the right to 
freedom of establishment through Art 43 and 48 in the EC Treaty. However, 
as the legal situation appears today, this freedom of establishment is 
restricted.  
 
In accordance with the freedom of establishment, natural persons are 
entitled to incorporate companies in any Member State and legal persons 
can, almost without restrictions, set up secondary establishments, that is 
branches, agencies or subsidiaries in any Member State. The Member State 
of arrival cannot lawfully, with a few exceptions, none of which yet has 
been applied, hinder or place limitations on such an establishment. So far, 
nothing in the ECJ case law or in legal writing indicates what situations and 
measurements would qualify as exceptions and it is uncertain if there will 
ever be a case where the protective interests, such as for example public 
policy, will be considered as more important than the fundamental right to 
freedom of establishment. This means that on the one hand freedom of 
establishment is highly protected. However, would a company wish to move 
its registered seat, i.e. its registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business, problems occur. It has been ruled by the ECJ 
that, since companies only exist by virtue of the national law under which 
they were incorporated, Member States are free to hinder and place 
restrictions on the transfer of companies registered seats from their territory. 
This means that it is not possible for a company to transfer its seat from one 
Member State and keep its legal status, as long as it does not follow from 
the national law of the State of origin. 
 
In the USA it is both possible and occurs frequently that companies are 
established in one state and later transferred and re-incorporated in another.  
The possibility to re-incorporate has lead to a regulatory competition, often 
referred to as the race to the bottom and the Delaware-effect, which has had 
the consequence that states have created more lenient company laws, where 
the protection for minority shareholders and workers has been neglected.  
Legal scholars unanimously agree that the reason behind the regulatory 
competition between states in the USA is primarily fiscal, since the states 
are entitled to levy franchise tax on companies incorporated under their 
legislation. The franchise tax constitutes a significant part of the income of 
states in the USA. 
 
Over the last decades a ferocious debate regarding whether the EU is facing 
a future similar to that in the USA, where company laws have been 
undermined, has been going on. This thesis shows that even if the USA and 
the EU are similar to structure, the differences are prominent and thus the 
problems in the EU, would re-incorporation become possible, would not be 
the same as those present in the USA. The differences, such as the 
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prohibition for Member States to levy franchise tax or incorporation fees on 
companies wishing to establish in their territory, differences in ownership 
structure, do weaken the incitements for Member States within the EU to 
enter into regulatory competition. The fact that the incitements for Member 
States to enter into regulatory competition are weak, in combination with 
numerous other factors, inter alia the harmonisation process taking place 
within Community company law, language and cultural differences and the 
traditional non-competition perspective within company law making in the 
EU points towards a future, if re-incorporation will become possible, where 
an effect similar to that in the USA is not likely to occur. 
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Sammanfattning 
Den etableringsrätt, som föreskrivs medborgare i medlemsstater, och som 
även inkluderar juridiska personer, som bildats enligt lagen i en 
medlemsstat, är i dagsläget en sanning med modifikation. Fysiska personer 
kan utan restriktioner etablera företag i den medlemsstat de önskar och 
juridiska personer kan fritt bilda så kallade sekundära etableringar, det vill 
säga, filialer, dotterbolag eller öppna kontor i en medlemsstat annan än 
ursprungsstaten. Den stat där en fysisk person önskar bilda bolag, eller där 
en juridisk person önskar bilda en sekundär etablering, kan inte lagenligt, 
med vissa undantag, sätta upp restriktioner för eller hindra ett sådant 
händelseförlopp. För att rättfärdigas enligt undantagsregler måste de 
vidtagna åtgärderna uppfylla vissa krav och än så länge finns det ingenting i 
EG-domstolens rättspraxis eller i övrig doktrin som ger några indikationer 
på vilka situationer eller åtgärder som skulle kunna kvalificera under 
ovannämnda undantag och det är överhuvudtaget osäkert huruvida en 
situation skulle kunna uppstå där dessa skyddsintressen skulle komma att 
anses vara av större vikt än den fundamentala rätten till etableringsfrihet. 
 
Situationen ter sig dock mer problematisk om ett företag skulle vilja flytta 
sitt registrerade säte, det vill säga, sitt huvudkontor, sin centrala 
administration eller sitt huvudsakliga verksamhetsområde från en 
medlemsstat till en annan. EG-domstolen har uttalat sig att då företag endast 
existerar på grund utav och i enlighet med den nationella lag som de 
etablerade sig under är det möjligt för medlemsstater att fritt hindra eller 
utfärda restriktioner mot företag som önskar flytta från deras territorium. 
Med andra ord - det är inte möjligt för företag att flytta sitt registrerade säte 
från en medlemsstat och behålla sin legala status utan att detta följer av den 
nationella lag som råder i ursprungsstaten. 
 
I USA är däremot ett sådant förfarande möjligt och det sker frekvent att 
företag etablerar sig i en delstat för att sedan flytta sitt säte och 
återinkorporera sig i en annan. Återinkorporationsmöjligheten har haft 
regelkonkurrens som följd, vilket i sin tur lett till en urholkning av många 
delstaters bolagsrätt. I den juridiska debatten är man rörande överens om att 
det primära bakomliggande skälet till regelkonkurrensen i USA är av fiskal 
karaktär, då delstaterna har rätt att beskatta bolag, inkorporerade under deras 
lagar, med en så kallad franchise-skatt, vilket inbringar stora delar av 
delstaternas inkomst. 
 
De senaste årtiondena har det pågått en hätsk juridisk debatt angående 
huruvida en eventuell liknande situation, med urholkad bolagsrätt som följd, 
skulle kunna komma att uppstå i EU om etablering utan restriktioner skulle 
bli möjlig. Detta examensarbete visar att även om USA och EU liknar 
varandra på ytan, så förekommer det skillnader så stora att de problem som 
skulle kunna uppstå i samband med att återinkorporation eventuellt skulle 
bli möjligt, är väsentligen annorlunda i EU än i USA. Skillnaderna, så som 
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till exempel förbudet för medlemsstater att belägga företag, som önskar 
etablera sig i en viss stat, med en skatt liknande franchise-skatten eller 
någon form av inkorporationsavgift, försvagar incitamenten för 
medlemsstater att påbörja regelkonkurrens. 
 
De svaga incitamenten för medlemsstater att ge sig in i regelkonkurrens 
kombinerat med ett stort antal andra faktorer, bland annat den 
harmonisering av bolagsrätten som sker inom EU, språk- och kulturella 
skillnader, samt den traditionella åsikten att medlemsstater inte ska 
konkurrera med varandra vad gäller bolagsrättslig lagstiftning, tyder på att 
det är mindre troligt att EU, om återinkorporation skulle bli möjligt, skulle 
gå samma framtid som USA till mötes. 
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Abbreviations 
Art Article 
 
Commission The European Commission 
 
Community The European Community 
 
EC European Community 
 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
 
EC Treaty Treaty Establishing the European 
Community as Amended by 
Subsequent Treaties, Rome, 25 
March, 1957 
 
EU The European Union 
 
Member State/ 
State 
Member State of the European 
Union 
 
The Union The European Union 
 
UK United Kingdom 
 
USA United States of America 
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1 Introduction  
One of the fundamental purposes of the European Union is to establish a 
common market and an economic and monetary union1, doing so by 
creating a common internal market where goods, persons, services and 
capital can move freely2. In accordance to Art 43 and Art 48 EC Treaty this 
includes the right to freedom of establishment, meaning that individuals as 
well as companies have the right to take up and pursue activities in other 
Member States of the EU than that of their domicile without being 
discriminated.   
 
Lately the interest in and the need of expanding the companies via 
establishment of branches in, or the movement of entire companies to other 
countries and cross-border cooperation, has been growing. Consequently, in 
order to increase the access to the market and facilitate the exchange 
between the Member States of the EU (further referred to as the Member 
States) there has been a constant development in harmonising the national 
laws of the Member States and drawing up supranational company 
formations. This leads to the question whether establishment can really 
occur without restrictions and, if so, are we facing the risk of the so-called 
Delaware-effect? Is a possible outcome of the strive towards a common 
market that the Member States will change their national company laws in 
order to attract more companies and initiate what is known as a race to the 
bottom? A scenario that might lead to the undermining of national company 
laws and at the same time have the effect of making the EU less competitive 
than if there was complete harmonisation in the company laws of its 
Member States. 
 
At large, this thesis will investigate to what extent companies are entitled to 
free movement within the EU. It will contain a report on ECJ case law in the 
field of freedom of establishment and what consequences that case law may 
have. Will it lead to an undermining of company laws within the Member 
States, meaning that the EU might be facing a possible Delaware-effect or 
are we looking at a future with harmonised company law within the Union? 
1.1 Purpose and Method 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the freedom of establishment of 
companies within the EU in order to find an answer to how vast the freedom 
of establishment really is. This will be done using regulations, directives, 
case law, preparatory legal material and legal writing.  Since one of the 
purposes of this thesis is to investigate what consequences have followed or 
might follow from ECJ case law, primarily case law and legal writing will 
be used. 
                                                 
1 Art 2, EC Treaty. 
2 Art 3(c), EC Treaty. 
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Further, the purpose of this thesis is to, in the light of the real seat theory 
and the incorporation theory, as well as ECJ case law discuss a possible 
Delaware-effect within the EU.  
 
It will be investigated if freedom of establishment without restrictions may 
lead to a situation similar to the one in the USA, where more than 50% of 
the companies are registered in one state (Delaware).3 This would mean that 
the Member States could be facing a future where the company laws provide 
no or a very small protection for shareholders, creditors and workers.  
 
1.2 Delimitations and Disposition 
This thesis will describe the current legal situation regarding EC freedom of 
establishment, including the issues arising from the application of it, 
meaning it will concentrate on Art 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty and what the 
case law concerning those two articles have brought forward.  
 
The rules governing the choice of law and the real seat theory as well as the 
incorporation theory will be described, followed by what problems occur in 
situations when the two principles are in conflict.  
 
Further, the thesis will describe and discuss if any restrictions on freedom of 
establishment are allowed, and if so, to what extent those restrictions limit 
the right to freedom of establishment.  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 will deal with the matters of the Delaware-effect and 
harmonisation within the EU. A comparison between the EU and the USA 
will be accounted for, to see if the EU is facing a future similar to that in the 
USA. The harmonisation taking place in the EU will be described, as an 
important factor affecting the future of EC Company law. 
 
The thesis will be completed with a discussion and conclusion on what the 
future has to bring for EC Company Law. 
                                                 
3 http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml 28th of September 2008. 
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2 Background 
2.1 The EC Treaty and the Freedom of 
Establishment 
Art 43 EC Treaty (further, if nothing else is indicated, all Articles referred to 
will be of the EC Treaty) provides that no restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of another Member State are allowed. This 
freedom of establishment also includes the right to set up and manage 
offices, branches or subsidiaries. It is made clear in Art 48 that this also 
applies to “companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Community”.4 Companies and firms 
are thus equal to natural persons, who are nationals of Member States.5 The 
ECJ has ruled that the registered seat of the company connects the company 
to the legal system of a State. The regeistered seat of a company can be 
found in the State in which the company or firm, formed in accordance with 
the law of a Member State, has its registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business.6
 
Activities that, even if just occasionally, are connected with the exercise of 
official authority can legitimise exceptions from the freedom of 
establishment. Art 46 allows deviation from the freedom of establishment if 
it can be justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health, but these measures have to be applied restrictively.7 In the case 
where there are no Community rules concerning a specific profession, each 
Member State can regulate freely, in so far as the measures are not 
discriminatory, either directly – nationals are treated more favourably than 
migrants, which is a breach of Art 43 and can only be justified by one of the 
abovementioned exceptions, or indirectly.8 Indirect discrimination is when 
measures seem to treat nationals and migrants equally but actually are 
disadvantageous to migrants, as can be the case where national licences are 
required in order to perform a specific profession. This, as well, constitutes 
a breach of Art 43 and the Member State must in such a case show that the 
criteria creating the negative effect is objective in relation to its purpose and 
that the reason for the measure is not based on the nationality of the 
economic activity. If that can be shown by the Member State the measure 
will not be seen as discriminatory.9
                                                 
4 Art 48(1) EC Treaty. 
5 Op. cit. 
6 C-270/83 Commission v. France, [1986] ECR 273, para. 18. 
7 Bogdan, M, Rätt att välja nationella bolagsformer inom EU, p 8. 
8 C-107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, para 17. 
9 See C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others [1988] ECR 2085, para 34 and joined 
cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte [2001] ECR 
I-7831. 
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In the Gebhard case10 it was stated by the ECJ that “national measures 
liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go 
beyond  what is necessary in order to attain it”11. These four requirements 
are usually referred to as the Gebhard test, which is further described in 
chapter 4.3. 
 
2.2 Primary and Secondary Establishment 
The freedom of establishment is applicable to both primary and secondary 
establishments. Primary establishment equals a complete transition, from 
one Member State to another, of a permanent establishment, that is; the 
transfer of the company’s registered seat. The transfer of a primary 
establishment from one Member State to another is prohibited12 by many 
Member States, hence, such a transfer is very scarce.13 Contrariwise, the 
transfer of secondary establishments, that is, the transfer of a second 
professional base, which was set up and maintained by a legal person in 
another Member State, occurs more frequently.14  
 
 
2.3 The Incorporation Theory and The 
Real Seat Theory 
Legal scholars distinguish between two theories used by the Member States 
to decide where a company has its registered seat. The colliding interests 
between these two principles – the real seat theory (also know as siège réel) 
and the incorporation theory and the fact that two different principles of law 
are used within the EU create difficulties.15 The difficulties become 
especially clear in the situation of interest in this thesis – when a company 
wants to conduct activity in, or move its activity or its registered seat from, 
one Member State to another.  
 
                                                 
10 C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165. 
11 Ibid. para 37. 
12 Such restrictions can only be placed by the State of origin and not by the Member State 
to which the company wishes to transfer. 
13 Barnard, C, The substantive Law of the EU, p 312 et seq. 
14 Bernitz, U and Kjellgren, A, Europarättens grunder, p 257. 
15 Barnard, C, The Substantive Law of the EU, p 342 et seq.  
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2.3.1 The Incorporation Theory 
Following the incorporation theory, applied in for example England, 
Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands16, a company will be considered as 
being subject to the law of the State where it is incorporated, regardless of if 
it has its registered seat there or if it even will conduct activity within that 
State.17 That is, where the actual activity of the company is conducted is 
immaterial when deciding upon applicable law, the company will be 
considered as having its registered seat in the State in which it is 
incorporated and thus it is regulated according to the laws of that State. A 
company established according to the rules of the Member State in which it 
is registered can in other words, according to the incorporation theory, 
conduct activity in another Member State and still retain its legal identity 
when transferring its registered seat to another Member State.18  
 
2.3.2 The Real Seat Theory  
From the real seat theory, traditionally applied in countries such as France, 
Germany and Italy19 follows that it is the law of the State where the 
company has its principal place of business, that is, where the main activity 
is conducted i.e. where the head office is situated, that will be applied.20
 
The real seat theory has been subject to discussion within the EU, since it 
can be seen as controversial and restricting in relation to the freedom of 
establishment, as will be shown in the following chapters. 
 
2.3.3 Possible Outcomes of a Transfer of an 
Establishment from one Member State to 
Another 
There are four possible scenarios when a company transfers its registered 
seat from one Member State to another: 
2.3.3.1 Incorporation Theory versus Incorporation Theory 
Would the case be that a company transfers its registered seat between two 
Member States, both applying the incorporation theory, the applicable law 
will remain the same. The company is considered by both Member States to 
have its registered seat in the Member State in which it is registered and this 
means that it is the law of that Member State that will be applicable and the 
company will keep its identity. Though, as will be shown in the third 
                                                 
16 Dotevall, R, Samarbete i bolag, p. 32. 
17 Werlauff, E, EU-selskabsret, p 4. 
18 Mucciarelli, M.F, Company ”Emigration” and EC Freedom of Establishment: Daily 
Mail Revisited, p 272.  
19 Barnard, C, The Substantive Law of the EU, p 343. 
20 Op. cit. 
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chapter, the Member States are entitled to set up restrictive requirements on 
the transfer out of the Member State.21
2.3.3.2 Real Seat Theory versus Real Seat Theory 
Does a company move its registered seat between two Member States, both 
applying the real seat theory, the law of the State of arrival will apply to the 
company. Even if the company after the transfer will be subject to the 
company law of the State of arrival it will keep its identity, meaning that the 
company will keep its legal and partial capacity, all assets, liabilities and 
contractual relations will remain unaffected in the State of arrival.22
2.3.3.3 Incorporation Theory versus Real Seat Theory 
If a company would move its registered seat from a Member State applying 
the incorporation theory to a Member State applying the real seat theory 
both Member States will claim to have the applicable legal system. The 
State of origin (i.e. the State of departure) will claim that the law where the 
company was registered will be applicable while the State of arrival will 
claim that it is the law where the company has its registered seat or where 
the main activity is conducted that shall apply. This would have the effect 
that the company, if the State of arrival would recognise the company, 
would be subject to two company laws.23  
2.3.3.4 Real Seat Theory versus Incorporation Theory 
The last possibility would be that a company transfers from a Member State 
applying the real seat theory to a Member State applying the incorporation 
theory. The State of origin will consider the company as being dissolved 
when the registered seat is transferred. The State of arrival will consider the 
law of the State where the company was registered as applicable. Since none 
of the States would claim to have the applicable law system24 this would, in 
my opinion, probably have the consequence that the company would be 
considered as non-existing and in order to conduct activity it has to re-
establish in the State of arrival. Worth mentioning is that the company will 
keep its legal capacity after the transfer under the condition that it still exists 
according to the law of the State of origin.25
 
Summarising, it can be said that if the company transfers the connecting 
factor in accordance with the conflict rules of the State of origin as well as 
the conflict rules of the State of arrival, the applicable company law will 
change. The substantive law of each Member State, regardless of what 
conflict rules are applicable, determines whether a continuance of the legal 
                                                 
21 Skog, R, Kan aktibolag emigrera?, p 21 et seq. and C-81/87 Daily Mail [1998] ECR 
5483. 
22 Neville, M and Sørensen, E, Selskabers Nationalitetsskifte, p 37 and C-208/00, 
Überseering [2002] ECR. I-9919. 
23 Skog, R, Kan aktiebolag emigrera?, p 21. 
24 Werlauff, E, EC Company Law: the common denominator for business undertakings in 
12 states, p 198. 
25 Skog, R, Kan aktiebolag emigrera?, p 22 and C-208/00, Überseering [2002] ECR. I-
9919. 
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identity of the company is at hand or not, i.e. if both the State of origin and 
the State of arrival agree upon it the company will retain its legal identity.26  
                                                 
26 Roth, W-H, From Centros to Überseering: free movement of companies, private 
international law, and community law, p 184 et seq. 
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3 ECJ Case Law 
As described in the previous chapters the freedom of establishment, the 
right for companies in one Member State to freely establish themselves, 
including the right to set up and manage offices, branches or subsidiaries in 
another Member State, is granted by Art 43 and 48. Over time, the ECJ has 
presented preliminary rulings on the interpretation of this freedom. The 
preliminary rulings that have had impact on and consequences for the 
freedom of establishment will be described and discussed in this chapter.  
 
3.1 C-81/87 Daily Mail 
C- 81/87 The Queen v H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland. 
Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1988] ECR 5483 
 
According to United Kingdom company law it is possible for a company 
incorporated under UK legislation and is having its registered office there, 
to establish its central management and control outside of the UK without 
losing its legal personality, or cease to be a company under UK law.27 In 
accordance with the UK tax legislation, a company is considered resident 
for tax purposes in the place in which its central management and control is 
located, and generally only those companies resident in the UK for tax 
purposes, are liable to UK corporation tax.28 Companies resident in the UK 
for tax purposes are prohibited from moving their central management and 
control without the consent of the Treasury.29 The British company Daily 
Mail applied for such consent with the Treasury in order to move its central 
management and control to the Netherlands for tax purposes30, which 
would, in reality, mean a transfer of the registered seat of the company.  
 
Daily Mail proceeded with the plan to transfer, without waiting for the 
consent of the Treasury and decided to open an investment management 
office in the Netherlands. The UK Treasury found that the transfer could be 
made if some of the company’s assets were sold before the transfer. Daily 
Mail initiated proceedings claiming that, according to, at that time, Art 52 
and 58 (today Art 43 and 48) no consent with the Treasury was necessary. 
Daily Mail claimed that, as a UK company, incorporated under the UK 
                                                 
27 C- 81/87 The Queen v H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland. Revenue, ex parte 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1988] ECR 5483, (further referred to as Daily Mail) 
para 3. 
28 Ibid, para 4. 
29 Ibid, para 5 and the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 of the UK, Section 
482(1)(a).  
30 The main reason for Daily Mail to transfer was to be able to sell non-permanent assets in 
order to buy its own shares without having to pay tax in the UK.  
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legislation it had the right to move its registered seat without losing legal 
capacity.31  
 
The ECJ stated that it is not possible to transfer a company’s registered seat 
from a State using the incorporation theory as long as it does not follow 
from the national law of that Member State. Further, it was stated by the 
ECJ that, “unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in 
the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist 
only by virtue of the varying national legislation, which determines their 
incorporation and functioning”.32 This means that the sole existence of the 
company is depending on the incorporation of the registered seat under the 
law of the State of origin and thus it is not possible, provided that it does not 
follow from the law of that State, to move the registered seat and preserve 
legal identity. As long as harmonisation in the area has not taken place, it is 
only possible to set up and manage secondary establishments in a Member 
State other than that of the company’s origin, or to wind up the company 
and then re-establish in the State of arrival, if nothing else follows from 
national law.33
 
To resume: the ECJ established that a company exists only by virtue of the 
national law according to which the company was formed. Further, it was 
stated that the Treaty does not regulate the differences that exist between the 
Member States national rules on connecting factors between the company, 
its existence and the State of origin, as well as the possibility to later change 
that connecting factor. The ECJ left this problem to be solved by future 
harmonisation. Hence, the Member State, that a company wishes to transfer 
from, but still keep its legal identity in, is entitled to place restrictions on the 
transfer, if the company is formed in accordance with the laws of that 
Member State. 
 
It is important to point out that the ruling in the Daily Mail case concerned 
emigration, i.e., a company wishing to transfer its registered seat, while 
retaining its legal status in the State of origin and invoking its rights against 
that State and not against the State of arrival.  
 
The conclusion drawn from this case, with the latter statement in mind, is 
that Community law does not provide companies with a right to freely 
transfer their primary establishment, in lieu the right to transfer primary 
establishments and keep legal identity has to be granted by the national law 
under which the company is incorporated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Daily Mail, para 7 et seq. 
32 Ibid. para 19. 
33 Ibid., para 14 et seq. 
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3.2 C-212/97 Centros 
C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 
 
United Kingdom law imposes no requirements on limited liability 
companies as to the provision for, and the paying-up of a minimum share 
capital.34 Knowing this, two Danish nationals established the company 
Centros Ltd (further referred to as Centros) in the UK, with the intention to 
thereafter set up a branch in Denmark. The Danish Board of registration did 
however refuse such a registration on the grounds that the company 
conducted no activity in the UK and thus the sole purpose of the registration 
of the branch was to avoid the Danish national rules regarding minimum 
share capital. Further, the Board claimed that, in order to protect private or 
public creditors and other contracting parties, as well as preventing 
fraudulent insolvencies, the refusal had to be considered as justified.35 
Centros invoked its right to freedom of establishment by referring to Art 52 
and 58 (today Art 43 and 48).  
 
The ECJ stated that it “is immaterial that the company was formed in the 
first Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in the second, 
where its main, or indeed entire, business is to be conducted”36. Creating an 
obstacle for a company established in accordance with the rules of another 
Member State, to set up a secondary establishment in another Member State 
is a restriction to the freedom of establishment. Thus, the refusal by the 
Danish Board to register the branch was seen by the ECJ as being 
unlawfully restrictive to the freedom of establishment.37 The Danish 
authorities objected that since the purpose of the actions taken by the Danish 
couple was to circumvent the application of the national law governing 
formation of private limited companies it should be considered as abuse of 
the freedom of establishment.  
 
A Member State is entitled to take measures to prevent its nationals from 
attempting, under cover of the freedom of establishment, improperly to 
circumvent the national legislation or to prevent individuals from 
improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community 
law38. Such measures have to be taken with the objectives pursued by the 
provisions granting the rights (here; the right to freedom of establishment) 
in mind.39 The provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment intend 
to enable secondary establishment. Hence, a national of a Member State 
who sets up a company in the Member State, which he finds has the least 
restrictive company laws and then wishes to set up branches in other 
                                                 
34 C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459 (further 
referred to as Centros) para 3. 
35 Ibid. para 12.  
36 Ibid. para 17. 
37 Ibid. para 19 et seq. 
38 Ibid. para 24 and C-115/78 Knoors [1979] ECR 399, para 25, and Case C-61/89 
Bouchoucha [1990] ECR I-3551, para 14. 
39 Centros, para 25. 
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Member States cannot be seen as abusing the right to freedom of 
establishment.40  
 
Even though it was not explicitly stated in the judgement, it can be seen that 
the ruling in the Centros case creates an obstacle for the use of the real seat 
theory and speaks in favour for the use of the incorporation theory. The 
consequence then would be that companies to a wider extent would be able 
to transfer between Member States. However, since Member States are 
entitled to take restrictive measures on the emigration of companies, there 
will be no prominent difference in the legal situation, other than a possible 
tendency towards the use of solely the incorporation theory.  
3.3 C-208/00 Überseering 
C-208/00, Überseering BV. v Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement 
GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919 
 
Überseering BV (further referred to as Überseering), a company 
incorporated under the law of the Netherlands, had acquired a piece of land 
in Germany, which it used for business purposes. By a project-management 
contract NCC was obliged to perform certain construction work on the site. 
As the obligations had been performed by NCC Überseering claimed part of 
the work to be defective, though, NCC was unwilling to meet with the 
requirements.Two years later, two German nationals residing in Germany 
acquired all the shares in Überseering and they unsuccessfully sought 
compensation from NCC for the defect work. Überseering then brought an 
action before the Regional Court in Germany.   
 
The Regional Court and later the Higher Regional Court dismissed the 
action on the grounds that, as Germany applies the real seat theory, the 
registered seat of the company had been moved from the Netherlands to 
Germany when the shares had been acquired by the German nationals. The 
German Courts thus stated that the legal capacity of Überseering should be 
assessed in accordance with German law and, since the company had not 
been re-established as required by German law when the registered seat was 
transferred, the company had no legal capacity and thus it could not be 
subject to a trial in Germany.41  
 
The case ended up in the German Federal Court of Justice, which stayed the 
proceedings and asked for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. The Federal 
Court of Justice of Germany referred questions asking whether or not, based 
on the fact that the company's actual centre of administration had been 
transferred to another State, the freedom of establishment laid down in Art 
43 and 48 prohibits connecting the company's legal capacity with the law of 
                                                 
40 Ibid. para 26 et seq.  
41 C-208/00, Überseering BV. v Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement GmbH [2002] 
ECR I-9919 (further referred to as Überseering), para 6-12. 
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the Member State in which its registered seat is located.42 The ECJ stated 
that Art 43 and 48 guarantees the freedom of establishment and it is 
necessary that the companies wanting to exercise that right are recognised 
by any Member State in which they wish to establish themselves.43 
Following this, the ECJ stated that, by demanding re-establishment of a 
company having transferred its registered seat from one Member State to 
another German law constituted a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment.44  
 
This ruling and the judgement in Centros implement restrictions on the use 
of the real seat theory and speak for a development towards making it 
impossible for Member States to apply the real seat theory.  
3.4 C-167/01 Inspire Art 
C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel. en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire 
Art Ltd  [2003] ECR I-10155  
Inspire Art Ltd (further referred to as Inspire Art) was established under the 
laws of England and Wales. Inspire Art had established a branch in the 
Netherlands, where the sole director of the company was resident. Inspire 
Art traded solely in the Netherlands, i.e. this is where the main activity of 
the company was performed. The Dutch branch of Inspire Art was 
registered at the Commercial registry in the Netherlands. The registry, 
however, took the view that, since the company had been formed according 
to the laws of a State other than the Netherlands but performed its main 
activity in the Netherlands, the company should, according to Dutch law, 
inform the registry about the situation and be registered as a formally 
foreign company.45 Being a formally foreign company in the Netherlands, 
Inspire Art would have to, inter alia, comply with the minimum 
capitalisation rules for Dutch limited liability companies.46
The ECJ continued its tendency of deciding in favour of freedom of 
establishment. It held that Art 2 of the Eleventh Directive47, which is 
considered to be exhaustive, in so far as it does not affect the information 
obligations imposed on branches under social or tax law, or in the field of 
statistics, does not provide for the recording in the commercial register that 
the company is formally foreign.48 Noticeable is that ECJ reasons around 
                                                 
42 Ibid. para 22. 
43 Ibid. para 59. 
44 Ibid. para 82. 
45 C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel. en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd  
[2003] ECR I-10155 (further referred to as Inspire Art), para 22 and para 34-37. 
46 WFBV (Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen) 17th december 1997, para 2-
5. 
47 Eleventh Council Directive of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in 
respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the 
law of another State (89/666/EEC). 
48 Inspire Art, para. 69. 
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rules in the Dutch legislation other than that in question, expressing that the 
information obligation would constitute a breach to the freedom of 
establishment even in the case that the Eleventh Directive49 would not 
exist.50  
The ECJ, yet again,51 stated that, with regard to application of the rules of 
freedom of establishment, a company is entitled to have any reason, as long 
as it is not fraudulent or abusive, for choosing to establish in a particular 
Member State. The fact that a company chooses to form in a particular 
Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more 
favourable legislation, could not be seen as fraud, regardless of whether the 
main or entire activity of the company is conducted elsewhere. 
3.5 C-210/06 Cartesio (Case pending) 
C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt (Reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Szegedi Ítélötábla (Hungary) 
 
Cartesio, a Hungarian limited partnership applied to the Hungarian Court of 
Registration for registration of the transfer of the company’s registered seat 
to Italy. Cartesio had the intention to transfer solely its operational 
headquarter (i.e. its registered seat52) and still continue to operate under 
Hungarian company law, by remaining its legal capacity under the latter.53 
The real seat theory is applied in Hungary and according to Hungarian law 
such a procedure is not possible. In order to transfer its operational 
headquarters Cartesio would have to dissolve in Hungary and then re-
establish under Italian law.54
Cartesio brought an appeal against the decision of the Commercial Court 
before the Court of Appeal, who stayed the proceedings for a preliminary 
ruling and asked whether Art 43 and 48 preclude a Member State from not 
allowing a company, incorporated under its legislation to transfer its 
registered seat to another Member State. 
                                                 
49 Eleventh Council Directive of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in 
respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the 
law of another State (89/666/EEC). 
50 Bogdan, M, Rätt att välja nationella bolagsformer inom EU, p 17. 
51 Inspire Art. para. 96 and C-79/85 Segers v Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en 
Verzekeringswegen, Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen [1986] ECR 2375, para. 16 and C-
212/97 Centros, para. 17. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt 
(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Szegedi Ítélötábla (Hungary), lodged on 5 
May 2006, delivered on 22 May 2008, (further referred to as Cartesio) para 22. 
53 Ibid. para. 1.  
54 Ibid. para. 3. 
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3.5.1 Possible Outcome in Case C-210/06 
Cartesio 
As mentioned before, the ECJ stated, in the Daily Mail case55 that unlike 
natural persons, companies are creatures of national law and exists only by 
virtue of that law56. Therefore, the ECJ came to the conclusion in the Daily 
Mail case that, the UK, being the State of origin was not, when imposing 
certain conditions on UK companies wishing to transfer their registered seat, 
in breach of Community law.  
 
However, as shown in the previous chapters, Community law and recent 
case law have had the tendency to move towards a more liberal stand 
regarding the freedom of establishment. Advocate General in the Cartesio 
case is of that same opinion, saying that the case law has developed since 
the ruling in the Daily Mail case, apparent due to the fact that more recent 
case law has been moving in the opposite direction of the view taken in the 
Daily Mail case.57 According to Advocate General national law can no 
longer be seen as a matter falling outside the scope of the principle of 
freedom of establishment.58  
 
Further, he argues that the Hungarian rule infringes the freedom of 
establishment by prohibiting company migration. The Advocate General 
also finds that a rule completely prohibiting company migration cannot be 
seen as proportionate in comparison to the objective it was aimed at 
satisfying (here; public interest).59
 
Whether the ECJ will follow the opinion of the Advocate General or not is 
impossible to answer. On the one hand we have seen a tendency that the 
freedom of establishment is such a fundamental right that it should be 
protected to the widest extent possible. On the other hand we have the fact 
that there already exists a ruling regarding a very similar question.60 
Though, the controversy of the ECJ overruling itself is not present here, 
since the Cartesio case concerns a complete restriction on the transfer of the 
registered seat of a company, while Daily Mail does not. This might have 
the outcome that completely restricting companies from transferring their 
registered seat will be seen as incompatible with Community law, but 
restrictions solely making it more difficult for companies to emigrate will 
still be allowed under the prerequisites discussed in chapter 4. Even though, 
I find it more likely, that the ECJ will come to a decision that will not 
distinct variations in the way of restricting, but treat them equally as just 
restricting measures. 
  
                                                 
55 Daily Mail and chapter 3.1. 
56 Ibid. para. 19. 
57 Cartesio, para. 27. 
58 Op. cit.  
59 Ibid. para 32 et seq. 
60  Daily Mail and chapter 3.1. 
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Should the ECJ come to a similar conclusion as Advocate General Maduro 
the Member States will no longer be able to place restrictions on the transfer 
of the registered seat of companies and this will eliminate the use of the real 
seat theory. Such an outcome will also make it necessary to review whether 
restrictive measures, such as the fees/taxes that some Member States impose 
on companies emigrating are to be incompatible with the freedom of 
establishment. Today these fees and taxes are possible as long as 
Community law does not already regulate the matter.61
3.6 “Immigration” and “Emigration” 
Cases 
As stated above, the Daily Mail case concerned the transfer of a company’s 
registered seat from its State of origin. In its ruling the ECJ found no 
violation of Community law in the fact that the State of origin did not allow 
such a transfer. The ECJ distinguished the matter at issue in Überseering 
and Inspire Art from the issues discussed in Daily Mail without overruling 
the decision in the latter. Daily Mail concerns what impact the laws of the 
State of origin may have on the continuing existence of the company, while 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art as a contrast, concern the impact the 
laws of the State of arrival have on a company making use of the right to 
freedom of establishment.  
 
To summarise: the conflict law and company law of a Member State can 
place limitations on the transfer abroad of the registered seat of domestic 
companies but the State of arrival may not, without violating Art 43 and 48, 
refuse to regognise the existence of the company or place restrictions on the 
continuing extistence of the company, exept if it is incorporated under the 
laws of another Member State, which recognises its continued existence. 
However, it was stated, probably in obiter dictum, in Daily Mail that even 
though Art 43 and 48 “are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals 
and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as 
nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of (…) a company 
incorporated under its legislation (…). The rights guaranteed by Articles 52 
et seq. (today; Articles 43 et. seq.) would be rendered meaningless if the 
Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to 
establish themselves in another Member State”62. This statement did not 
affect the ruling in that specific case but was later used as a ratio decidendi 
in for example the Marks & Spencer case.63 It was also used in the ICI 
case64, where a tax relief, only applicable to companies resident and 
                                                 
61 C-107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, para 17. 
62 Daily Mail, para. 16. 
63 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty´s Inspector of Taxes) 
[2005] ECR I-10837, para 31. 
64 C-264/96 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty´s 
Inspector of Taxes) [1998] ECR I-4695, para 16. 
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conducting their main activities of the controlling entities in the UK, was 
considered as incompatible with freedom of establishment. 
 
The abovementioned quote shows incitements that as clear as it has been 
that Member States can place restrictions on companies wanting to transfer 
from that Member State, but not on companies transferring to it, there is 
now a tendency in not making the same sharp distinction between cases of 
emigration and immigration, but instead treat emigration cases as similar to 
immigration cases. 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks on the 
Discussed ECJ Case Law 
It is apparent from the case law discussed in the previous chapters that any 
person, natural or legal, who is a national of a Member State has the right to 
choose were it wishes to establish itself. It is immaterial whether the reason 
for that choice is that they consider the legal framework of that particular 
State to be the most advantageous or if they have intentions to conduct their 
main activity through secondary establishments in a different State. If an 
establishment has been incorporated under the law of a Member State any 
other Member State must recognise the legal capacity of that establishment.  
 
It can be said that the freedom of establishment is considered a very 
fundamental right of great importance in order to be able to create a 
common market within the Community. Even though, there are some 
restrictions, further discussed in the following chapter, that are exempted 
and it remains to be seen if there will be a change regarding the restricted 
transfer of primary establishments, it is evident that the ECJ has given Art 
43 and Art 48 a vast interpretation and so far only restrictions on the transfer 
by a company from a Member State have been considered by the ECJ to be 
justified. 
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4 Restrictions on the Freedom 
of Establishment 
As shown above, the freedom of establishment is a very strong and 
fundamental right granted to companies in the EU. The ECJ has found that 
even in cases, where it is clear that the sole purpose of a certain 
incorporation has been to circumvent the rules and regulations of one 
Member State, such an act is not to be considered as abuse of the freedom of 
establishment. According to the ECJ it is rather the purpose of the freedom 
of establishment to be able to freely choose where to establish.65
There are however some allowed restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment which will be described below. The central question is what 
Member State interests that could be considered by the ECJ as more 
important than the purpose to strengthen the inner common market.  
4.1 Art 46 
Art 46 allows Member States to lay down laws, regulations or take 
administrative measures that restricts the freedom of establishment, in so far 
as it is called upon by public policy, public security or public health.66 So 
far, the ECJ has in its rulings repeatedly concluded that the exceptions laid 
down in Art 46 have not been applicable, but not specified when restrictive 
measures taken by Member States can be justified by Art 46, hence it is 
uncertain if there is actual cases that the ECJ would find to be covered by 
that exception.    
4.2 Fraud and Abuse 
As shown in Centros and Inspire Art67the prevention of fraud and abuse can 
justify restrictions on the freedom of establishment. In both cases the ECJ 
treat the question of fraud and abuse in connection with the security of 
public creditors, but nothing in the rulings implies that fraud and abuse 
would not be able to justify restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
even in cases concerning other matters. 
 
Member States are entitled to, under the consideration of the purpose with 
the rules concerning freedom of establishment68, take actions in order to 
prevent its nationals from improperly evading national law or refer to 
Community law with the purpose of acting fraudulent or abusive.69
                                                 
65 Centros,  see chapter 3.2. 
66 Art 46(1), EC Treaty. 
67 See chapter 3.2 and 3.4. 
68 Centros, para 25. 
69 Looijestijn, A-C, Have the dikes collapsed? Inspire Art a further breakthrough in the 
freedom of establishment of companies? p 393. 
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The ECJ made clear in the Centros case that the main purpose of Art 43 and 
48 is to make it possible for companies, incorporated in accordance with the 
law of a Member State, to conduct activity in another.70Further, it was 
clarified in Inspire Art71that the question on existence of abuse has to be 
considered in every case individually. Meaning that, a Member State can 
only take action against abuse or fraud when it has been established that 
fraud or abuse is present in the particular case and Member States can 
therefore not take general measures in order to prevent fraudulent or abusive 
acts. 
4.3 The Gebhard-test – the Rule of 
Reason 
The ECJ has in the above-mentioned cases repeatedly stated that an 
overriding reason relating to the pubic interest, such as the protection of 
creditors, minority shareholders, employees, or fiscal interests72, can justify 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment. For national rules and 
measures that impose restrictions on the freedom of establishment to be 
justified it is necessary that they comply with the so called Gebhard-test, 
which means that they are applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they 
are justified by imperative requirements in the public interest; they are 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue, 
and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.73
 
The Gebhard-test has developed from the well-known judgement in the 
Cassis de Dijon case74 according to which limitations on the free movement 
of goods may be justified for reasons related to the public interest if they do 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain the goal of public interest.  
 
In none of the above-mentioned cases did the ECJ find the measures to be 
justified in accordance with those requirements and the question of when 
these requirements are considered to be fulfilled and consequently can 
justify restrictions on the freedom on establishment remains unanswered.  
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. para. 26. 
71 Inspire Art, para. 105 and para. 143. 
72 See for example Ibid. para. 132 and 135 and Centros para. 34-37. 
73 The so-called Gebhard-test, see C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR 
I-1663, para. 32, and C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, para. 37. 
74 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649. 
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5 Will There Be a Race to the 
Bottom? 
By giving an extensive interpretation to the rules of freedom of 
establishment the ECJ opened up for the possibility for any national of a 
Member State, who wishes to establish itself within the EU to go forum 
shopping75, that is to find and choose to establish in the Member State with 
the, from his/her point of view, most profitable legal framework.  
 
Forum shopping may have the consequence that the Member States start to 
compete amongst each other, developing more liberal company laws in 
order to get as many companies as possible to establish within their State. 
Some legal scholars claim that this will lead to an undermining of company 
laws within the EU – known as the race to the bottom.76 Such an outcome 
has been seen in the USA, where more than 50 percent of all the companies 
are registered in the state of Delaware.77
 
5.1 The Delaware-effect 
Since the delivery of the judgement in the Centros case there has been a 
debate between European legal scholars as to whether the EU is facing a 
development similar to the one in the USA. Such a development is often 
referred to as a race to the bottom, meaning that a regulatory competition is 
initiated and followed by more lenient company laws that only will benefit 
the interests of the founders and directors and not shareholders, workers etc.  
In the following sections it will be discussed if it is likely that regulatory 
competition will occur within the EU and if so if such a regulatory 
competition will lead to a Delaware-effect. 
 
5.1.1 The Delaware-effect – a Background 
The states of the USA apply the incorporation theory, meaning that 
nationals can freely choose a state, which ever they find has the most 
attractive company laws and establish themselves there, while conducting 
their main activity elsewhere.78It is even possible for founders of companies 
                                                 
75 I am conscious about the fact that “forum shopping” traditionally refers to the process by 
which a plaintiff chooses among two or more courts that have the correct jurisdiction and 
venue to consider his/her case. But I have decided to use forum shopping in this thesis as 
referring to when founders or decision makers of companies chooses between the laws of 
different Member States when setting up a primary or secondary establishments.   
76 Sevrinsson, D. EG:s etableringsrätt för bolag, p 86f. and Søndergaard. B, H, The fear of 
the Delaware-effecct, the american demon? p  247. 
77 http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml 21st of October 2008. 
78 McCahery. A, J. and Vermeulen, P.M., E, Does the European Company Prevent the 
“Delaware-effect”?, p 7. 
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to incorporate under the laws of one state and later re-incorporate under the 
laws of another. This has lead to a competition where the states constantly 
revise their company laws in order to attract as many companies as 
possible.79 New Jersey and Delaware were the first two states, in the late 
19th century, to adopt modernised general incorporation statutes and 
eventually, in 1920, Delaware was the leading incorporation state in the 
USA. Since then it has kept its leading role, hence - the Delaware-effect, 
and has developed a great judicial expertise and extensive case law within 
the field of company law.80
 
5.1.2 Forum Shopping 
As mentioned, it is possible to forum shop within the EU, save as not 
transferring the company’s registered seat, and as has been shown,81even if 
it is uncertain to what extent, forum shopping actually occurs. When natural 
or legal persons, who are nationals of a Member State wish to establish 
themselves or to set up secondary establishments they can freely choose 
were to do so. Most likely, they will choose to establish in the Member State 
that they find most advantageous. Affecting the choice of where to establish 
is the general company law of a Member State, but also, inter alia, the 
procedure and minimum share capital connected with the establishment as 
well as taxation, protection of minorities and creditors and an attractive 
location, worker conditions and, in my opinion, different companies 
emphasise on different things when establishing. For example, if the 
founders of the establishment are shareholders in majority there is an 
imminent risk that they will choose to incorporate in a Member State where 
the rights of shareholders in minority are put aside and where they will 
remain in control of the company, whereas the situation will be the reverse 
if the founders are shareholders in minority. Other factors that play a great 
role when choosing where to establish are existence of qualified workforce, 
accessibility of raw materials as well as labour law and environmental 
law.82
5.1.3 Regulatory Competition 
In order for any competition to occur there has to be a supply and a demand 
side. In order for regulatory competition to occur there must be a possibiltity 
to choose applicable law by choosing the place of either incorporation or re-
incorporation, i.e. demanding advantageous company laws. At the same 
time company law makers must be willing to supply laws, that will be 
concidered by founders and directors (since directors in many cases make 
the decission or have a great impact on the decission where to establish) as 
                                                 
79 Søndergaard. B, H, The fear of the Delaware-effect, the american demon? p 245. 
80 McCahery. A, J. and Vermeulen, P.M., E, Does the European Company Prevent the 
“Delaware-effect”?, p 7 et seq. 
81 See chapter 3. 
82 Kieninger, E-M, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on Company 
Mobility: EU and US Compared - Part II/II, p 742. 
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advantagoeus.83Therefor - with the possibiltiy for founders and directors of 
establishments to choose under what regulatory framework to establish 
comes the incentive for Member States to compete for the most profitable 
regulations and thus attract more companies.  
 
In my opinion the supply and demand sides are based on a “win-win-
situation”, that is - the companies will not choose to incorporate under the 
legislation of a State if it is not beneficial enough and the State will not 
make an effort to attract companies if the benefits with doing so will not 
outweigh the disadvatages.  
5.1.4 Concequences of Forum Shopping and 
Regulatory Competition 
There are different views on whom the regulatory competition benefits - the 
shareholders or the directors? Does regulatory competition make individual 
states adapt their laws into legislation that enables companies to optimise 
shareholder investments or into legislation that is more favourable to 
directors than to shareholders? Does forum shopping and regulatory 
competition lead to a “race to the bottom”, “a race to the top” or neither? 
5.1.4.1 Race to the Bottom 
Some legal scholars oppose competition and advocate an increase in 
company regulation at federal level, in fear that company law will be more 
beneficial to directors than to shareholders if regulatory competition 
becomes a fact. 84
 
In the USA the general assumption is that the directors of the company 
make the actual decision on re-incorporation and consequently, the directors 
will choose to re-incorporate in the State that, from their point of view, 
offers the most favourable legislation. In the USA this has had the 
consequence that states are trying to create company laws that are attractive 
to the company decision-makers and, according to those advocating an 
increase in company regulation at federal level, finally an undermining of 
company laws.85
5.1.4.2 Race to the Top 
Other legal scholars are of the same opinion – that regulatory competition 
will lead to an undermining of company laws but they, on the other hand, 
see this resulting in company laws more beneficial to company shareholders 
than to directors. They are of the opinion that the company directors will, 
controlled by market forces, seek to maximise values for both shareholders 
and directors and thus choose to re-incorporate in the State that, according 
to them, meet with those requirements. Would the management be poor, the 
price on the shares of the company would decrease and the risk of a hostile 
                                                 
83 Op. cit. 
84 Søndergaard. B, H, The fear of the Delaware-effect, the american demon? p. 247. 
85 Op. cit. 
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takeover, where new directors will be appointed, will increase. The directors 
of companies will therefore try to maximise the earnings of the companies, 
which is naturally followed by an increase in the value for the shareholders. 
Correspondingly, the Member States will compete to offer optimal, value 
maximising legislation, beneficial to both directors and shareholders. 
5.2 Is the Future of the EU Comparable to 
the Present Situation in the USA? 
Looking at the USA and the EU they, prima facie, are similar. They both 
consist of states with their own legislation at national/state level, provided 
that the legislations are compatible with EU law/national law. The USA and 
the EU have a system with individual states where the states/Member States 
have the power to regulate company matters, save as in the EU, within the 
framework of directives.86 As mentioned above87the incorporation theory is 
applied throughout the USA as well as in many Member States of the EU 
but, the application of the real seat theory in the EU is still widespread. 
Many Member States today apply the real seat theory and fear, since the 
ECJ one time after another has broadened the meaning of the freedom of 
establishment, that forum shopping will be possible without any restrictions, 
neither to secondary establishments, nor to primary. What the future rulings 
of the ECJ will bring regarding the possibility to establish freely remains to 
be seen, however, further a description of possible outcomes would the 
freedom to establish in any Member State become unrestricted will be 
given.  
 
The following sections will discuss the differences and similarities between 
the EU and the USA in order to determine whether the formal and statutory 
frameworks as well as the incentives for Member States to compete are 
directly comparable.  
5.2.1 Differences Between the USA and the EU 
5.2.1.1 Incorporation and Re-incorporation 
The first and most legible difference between the EU and the USA is that 
within the USA all formal and statutory rules allow forum shopping in the 
situation of both incorporation and re-incorporation. Re-incorporation, that 
is when the company transfers its registered seat from one Member State to 
another while retaining its identity, is only possible within the EU if it 
follows from national law, in any other case the company will be seen as 
dissolved in the State of origin and for one thing be liable to pay tax as if it 
was liquidated. 
 
When incorporating a company, within the USA as well as in the EU, the 
promoters have to choose where to incorporate the company. Potential 
                                                 
86 Ibid. p 244. 
87 See chapter 4.1.1. 
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shareholders will have the information about where the company is 
incorporated and thus they will know what rules will apply to the company 
and with that information decide whether to subscribe on shares in a 
company incorporated in that state/Member State. This safeguards the 
shareholders from the situation where a company might transfer its 
registered seat and therefore become subject of the law of another 
state/Member State. It does not, however, protect the shareholders from the 
situation where the State of origin weakens its company law in order to 
attract more companies.88
 
With the possibilities of being able to re-incorporate, which has the 
consequence that the company will no longer be subject to the law of the 
State of origin but to the law of the State of re-incorporation, comes the 
possibilities for company founders and directors to change applicable law 
without agreement from the shareholders. Such a scenario enables the 
founders and directors to look after their own interests and not those of the 
shareholders, meaning that with re-incorporation comes the risk of 
insufficient protection of shareholder interests.   
 
In the USA there is a predominant tendency of having diversified 
ownership, where it is fairly easy for the owners to affect the directors of the 
company to collectively agree on one matter, while it is harder for the 
shareholders and this gives the directors of the company a great power when 
choosing where to re-incorporate. In the EU, however, the ownership is 
usually, save as the UK is not included, concentrated, which means that 
ownership and control is merged.89 Therefore, protecting the shareholders 
against the acts of the directors will not be a problem within the EU, would 
re-incorporation become possible. The problem will be to ensure that 
majority shareholders do not act opportunistically at the expense of interests  
of minority shareholders. This may be the case if no rules on voting ceilings 
apply and a majority shareholder owns a proportion of shares that is 
sufficiently large to vote in favour of a re-incorporation from which he will 
benefit or use his votes to appoint directors that are likely to act in 
accordance with what the majority shareholder wishes.90
 
5.2.1.2 Other Factors of Significance in Connection with Re-
incorporation 
If re-incorporation would become possible within the EU, there are several 
other differences between the USA and the EU which, in my opinion, makes 
it less possible that a Delaware-effect will occur within the EU.   
There are the obvious differences that in the USA there are no language 
differences and no, or very small, cultural and economic differences 
between the states and within the EU there are significant differences 
between the languages spoken in and the cultures and the economics of the 
                                                 
88 Søndergaard. B, H, The fear of the Delaware-effect, the american demon? p 252 et seq. 
89 Neville, M, Ejerstruktur och Corporate Governance, p 72 et seq. 
90 Engsig Sørensen, K and Neville, M, Corporate Migration in the European Union, p 200 
et seq. 
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various Member States. Problems may arise for example in legal matters. 
Since not many national laws can be found in other languages than the 
national language of the Member State in question the communication 
between the company and the legal advisers will occur in a foreign 
language, which may lead to complications as to interpretation and 
understanding, a risk that may increase even more if the cultures differ.  
Further, there are two differences of great significance between the USA 
and the EU. First, which will be discussed below in chapter 6, there is the 
harmonisation process of company law within the EU that has been taking 
place and most likely will continue to take place. Even if that process is 
taking place very slowly and today leaves a great opportunity for 
competition to occur in many areas, it is a fact that harmonisation within the 
EU is taking place, contrary to what has happened and is happening in the 
USA. Second, even if the harmonisation process would cease to continue, 
the fact that legal expertise and case law concerning newly created laws in 
the Member States will be undeveloped, compared to the experience of over 
a hundred years in Delaware, will also create a hindrance to the 
development of regulatory competition.  
 
5.2.1.2.1 Incentives for Member States to Compete 
The main reason to why states in the USA have entered regulatory 
competition is to a great extent fiscal, due to the fact that a franchise tax is 
paid by companies to the state of incorporation91, but a similar tax92, as well 
as a registration fee exceeding the real cost93 is prohibited within the EU.  
Even if the income of the franchise tax is undisputedly the main reason to 
why regulatory competition began and still is taking place in the USA94 and 
similar measures are prohibited within the EU it does not mean that the 
establishment of companies would not mean an income to the State of 
incorporation – a company is liable to pay tax on its income. Where the tax 
will be paid is today determined either by where the company is registered 
or where the main activity of the company takes place or, as in some 
Member States, where both criteria are applied. If both criteras are applied a 
company may be fully liable to pay tax in the Member State in which it is 
has its registered seat. However, the Member State, in which the company 
has its source of income, is entitled to, conferred by a double taxation 
convention, levy tax on a substantial part of the income earned in that 
Member State. A company liable to pay tax in two Member States is usually 
considered to be resident in the Member State in which the company has its 
registered seat according to the provisions of a double taxation convention, 
                                                 
91 Ibid. p 766.  
92 Directive 69/335/EEC of July 17, 1969, Art. 2 (1) and Art. 10(a). 
93 C-71/91 and C-178/91 Ponente Carni Spa et al. v  Amministrazione delle finanze dello 
stato [1993] ECR I-1915, para 41et seq. C-188/95 Fantask A/S et al. v Industriministeriet 
(Erhvervsministeriet) [1997] ECR I-6783 and C-56/98 Modelo SGPS SA v Direcçáo-Geral 
dos Registos e Notariado [1999] ECR I-6427. 
94 Søndergaard. B, H, The fear of the Delaware-effect, the american demon? p 246. 
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and thus that Member State will have the right to levy tax on the income of 
that company.95
 
Further, company incorporation brings the source of revenue that derives 
from the expansion of for example accountants, financial business, law 
firms, etc. that follows with new incorporations.96 Expanding the 
workmarket is one very important incentive for States to comptete for 
company incorporation, but the question is whether that one incentive, 
together with the income tax, without the financial benefits of for example 
franchise tax, is enough reason for the States to weaken their company laws 
to that extent that it leads Member States to create company laws were only 
the interests of the directors and not the shareholders are concidered. 
 
Since franchise tax and registration fees are not allowed within the EU and 
double taxation is regulated, the fiscal reasons, which are mainly the base 
for the regulatory competition in the USA, are not as prominent in the EU 
and therefore the States within the EU will not have the same strong 
incentives, as the states in the USA, to compete. 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Different Objectives of Company Law 
In the EU the stakeholder perspective has traditionally been prevalent 
compared to the USA, where the shareholder perspective has had the 
leading role, meaning that different subjects are centre of the discussion 
regarding a possible weak protection that might follow from regulatory 
competition. In the USA the purpose of the companies is to generate a profit 
to the shareholders of the company and hence the American company laws 
are designed to protect the shareholders while EU company laws are 
designed to protect all the stakeholders in the company.  
 
A wish to keep a strong protection of all stakeholders may have an impact 
on whether States decide to compete or not. Overall, the view on regulatory 
competition in the EU has been negative, which likely will have the 
consequence that Member States will be reluctant to enter into regulatory 
competition. Should, however, a Member State decide to compete there is 
nonetheless the risk that the interest of the stakeholders might not be 
preserved.97  
 
 
                                                 
95 Søndergaard. B, H, The Fear of the Delaware-effect - the american demon? p 266. 
96 Kieninger, E-M, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on Company 
Mobility: EU and US Compared - Part II/II, p 766. 
97 Op. cit.  
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5.3 Concluding Remarks on the Race to 
the Bottom 
 
This chapter has clarified that regulatory competition in the field of 
company law has generally been considered as negative in the EU and 
parallels are often drawn to the American Delaware-effect.  
As shown above there are differences between the EU and the USA that 
most likely will have the consequence that regulatory competition will be 
less intense in the EU than in the USA. It has also been shown that, as long 
as re-incorporation within the EU is not possible the focus of the discussion 
should be the problems and risks with forum shopping and regulatory 
competition that are related to incorporation of a company and not re-
incorporation. The problem with scanty protection for shareholders is not 
present as long as the shareholders are aware of what rules apply to the 
company at the time of choosing to subscribe for shares in that company. Of 
course, the comparison with the American Delaware-effect is of relevance 
in so far as the judgement in the Cartesio case98, or any other case or 
Regulation in the future, would make re-incorporation possible, but there 
are still a lot of differences speaking for an outcome different in the EU than 
that in the USA. 
 
There is the difference of diversified ownership structure, predominant in 
the USA and concentrated ownership structure, predominant in the EU. The 
problem with directors choosing to re-incorporate in the State that he finds 
most beneficial to him is not an issue in the EU. Most States apply a 
structure of concentrated ownership, which instead would have the equally 
serious consequence that majority shareholders act opportunistically at the 
expense of minority shareholders, a problem that may be solved through 
rules on voting ceilings.  
 
The premium reason, in my opinion, to why I find it unlikely that the 
intensity of the regulatory competition in the EU will be as strong as that in 
the USA, is, in combination with other differences such as language barriers 
and the overall negative attitude towards regulatory competition, that the 
main reason to why states in the USA compete99- the income of the 
franchise tax is not present in the EU -. However, it is worth stressing that 
even though there are many differences there are also similarities and with 
those comes the risk of facing a future similar to the American. Due to the 
fact that there are both differences and similarities it is hard to accurately 
predict whether the risks in connection with re-incorporation will be the 
same in the EU as in the USA. 
 
I would, if free to speculate, say that there are incentives pointing to a 
direction where, would re-incorporation become possible and provided that 
                                                 
98 C-210/06 Cartesio Okotaó és Szolgáltató Betti Társaság, case pending. 
99 Søndergaard. B, H, The Fear of the Delaware-effect - the american demon? p 268. 
32 
 
full harmonisation of company laws will not take place, regulatory 
competition and forum shopping will become a fact. From my point of 
view, the incentives for Member States to compete are not as strong as in 
the USA and regulatory competition, overall, has been looked upon 
negatively within the EU, therefore the extent to which regulatory 
competition will take place within the EU will not be as fierce as in the 
USA, if noticeable at all. 
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6 Have the Judgements in 
Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art Led to Regulatory 
Competition within the EU? 
The decisions of the ECJ in the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art 
cases100placed restrictions on the use of the real seat theory and as a 
repercussion, legal scholars predicted a regulatory competition between the 
Member States to begin. The regulatory competition would, inter alia, lead 
to liberalisation on minimum share capital requirements and the rules 
regarding capital maintenance.101 Today, it has only been nine years since 
the ruling in the Centros case was delivered and this might be a too short of 
a time-span to draw final conclusions on to what extent the previously 
mentioned rulings have led to regulatory competition.  
 
Not to be disregarded, it can be noted, that a few Member States have 
introduced new company forms. For example, France has introduced a new 
way to form the Société à Responsabilité Limitée (translates “Society with 
limited liability”), which normally has a minimum authorised capital of 
7500€. Since 2003, it is possible to found the new form of Société à 
Responsabilité Limitée within 24 hours and with a minimum authorised 
capital of 1€. Formalities around the incorporation have been minimised and 
the newly founded companies benefit from tax reductions and social 
contributions within the first years of its existence.102
 
A legislation similar to the latter French one was introduced in Spain 
approximately at the same time as that in France. The Spanish Sociedad 
Limitada Nueva Empresa (translates “Limited Liability New Business”) 
needs, in contrast to the similar French version, a minimum authorised 
capital of 3012€ and a maximum authorised capital of 120 200€.  
 
It is evident that these new company forms are subject to rules more lenient 
than their precursors. However, nothing in the preparatory work of the 
legislations indicates that the legislations were created in order for the States 
to take part in regulatory competition, but rather that they were designed 
with a purpose to encourage the start-up of small and medium sized 
companies.103
 
                                                 
100 See chapter 3.2 – 3.4. 
101 Kieninger, E-M, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on Company 
Mobility: EU and US Compared - Part II/II, p 766. 
102 Op. cit.  
103 Ibid. p 768.  
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A company law reform is taking place in the UK. The law reform is 
explicitly taking place in order to make the UK more attractive to foreign 
companies and hence, more competitive in comparison to other Member 
States.104 What effect the company law reform in the UK will have remains 
to be seen after the reform process, which has been taking place for several 
years, is finished. At this stage, it is premature to say if it actually will 
encourage other Member States to enter into the competition or if the 
changes made will even be enough to make the UK more attractive, than it 
is today, to foreign companies.  
 
Evidently, after the judgement in Überseering founders of small and 
medium sized companies have taken advantage of the possibility to 
establish in Member States other than that of their domicile due to, inter 
alia, differences in minimum capital, access to raw materials and labour, 
etc. To what extent forum shopping is taking place amongst founders of 
small and medium size companies I have found no numbers on, what is 
clear is only that, it does not take place in the majority, or even close to the 
majority of cases of incorporation or setting up of branches, subsidiaries or 
agencies.  
 
At the same time as the judgements delivered by the ECJ in cases 
concerning freedom of establishment have had an impact on the 
incorporation of small and medium sized companies, the judgements have 
had a small effect on publicly held, listed companies. This, most likely 
because of the previously mentioned reasons105 and because the 
harmonisation process, that primarily concerns publicly held companies, has 
left Member States with small possibilities to deviate from Community 
company law in that specific area.106  
 
The result of the decisions of the ECJ has been that the “demand side”, that 
is the companies, so far mostly small and medium sized companies are 
forum shopping, even if not to a great extent. The “supply side”- the 
Member States, on the other hand, apart from the UK, have not started to 
change company laws in order to meet the demands of companies. The 
companies solely forum shop based on the differences in company laws that 
already exists between the Member States and so far, the feared race to the 
bottom has not been visible.  
                                                 
104 http://www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/corporate/performance/strategic-programme/index.html, 
11th of November 2008. 
105 See chapter 5. 
106 Kieninger, E-M, The Legal Framework of Regulatory Competition Based on Company 
Mobility: EU and US Compared - Part II/II, p 770. 
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7  Harmonisation of Company 
Law within the EU 
In the 1960´s, a harmonisation process of the company laws, with the 
purpose to create a common minimum standard in the national company 
laws of the Member States within the EU (at that time, the EEC) began. 
Since 1968, when the first Council directive107 was adopted, the 
Commission has drafted proposals to directives, inter alia directives 
concerning mergers, branches, accounting, capital, etc.108  
7.1 The 10th Company Law Directive 
After a lot of resistance, the 10th Directive on cross-border merger109 was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2005 and it should have been 
transposed by Member States no later than December 2007.110 The main 
objective of the 10th Company law Directive is to make mergers between 
limited-liability companies across Member State borders substantially easier 
by overcoming obstacles otherwise caused by different national laws.  
 
In accordance with the legal framework the mergers can only occur under a 
number of limitations, nonetheless, it is a part of the harmonisation process. 
It is premature to say if the 10th Company law Directive will have the actual 
effect that limited liability companies will make use of the possibility to 
merge cross-border or if the extent to which cross-border mergers will take 
place will remain more or less unchanged.  
 
7.2 The European Economic Interest 
Grouping 
The Regulation on the European Economic Interest Grouping111 (EEIG) 
entered into force in 1989 and made it possible for companies, firms and 
other legal entities, governed by public or private law, which have been 
formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and which have their 
                                                 
107 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member 
States of companies within the meaning of the second  paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community. 
108 Skog, R, Harmoniseringen av bolags- och börsrätten inom EU- ny vind i seglen, p 332. 
109 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (further referred to as the 10th 
Company law Directive). 
110http://www.workerparticipation.eu/company_law_and_cg/company_law/cross_border_m
ergers_10th, the 5th of November 2008. 
111 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
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registered office in the Community to develop certain joint activities 
without having to merge or set up a jointly owned subsidiary. An EEIG can 
move from one State to another by deregistering in the State of origin and 
later register in the State of arrival.112 The law applicable to EEIGs is the 
“internal law of the State in which the official address is situated, as laid 
down in the contract for the formation of the grouping”113. 
 
The purpose of making EEIGs possible was to facilitate cross-border 
mergers and to make the common market stronger.114 Today there are about 
a thousand EEIGs, mainly formed to reduce the costs of purchases and 
development and to strengthen the competitiveness toward new and existing 
clients.115 EEIGs can be a good alternative for large investments, calling for 
combined resources. It is beneficial in areas of for example marketing and 
public procurement, but even with the EEIGs there is still a lot to wish for in 
the area of company law harmonisation. An individual company with no 
interest in cooperating but with the wish to move its registered seat will not 
gain anything from an EEIG, but would be able to draw benefits from the 
14th Directive on Company Law116 (described below), would it be adopted, 
in other words, it is necessary for such a company that re-incorporation is 
possible. 
 
I would say that the EEIGs constitute a positive element in strengthening the 
common market. However, the Regulation117is very restrictive, most 
important, an EEIG cannot have as its purpose to make a profit.118 Because 
of the restrictive objectives of EEIGs it is not, nor do I see that it will be, a 
popular business form, nor do I consider it to be a valuable alternative to full 
harmonisation of EC company law. 
   
7.3 Societas Europaea – The European 
Company  
In 1970, the European company, also known as the Societas Europaea, or 
the SE, was suggested as a business form that allows firms, operating in at 
least two Member States to re-incorporate. The Regulation on the Statute for 
a European company119 was not adopted until approximately 30 years after 
                                                 
112 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG), Art 13f.  
113 Ibid. Art 2 para. 1.  
114 Ibid. The preamble. 
115 http://www.euroinfo.se/ny/hem/foretagsetablering/skrivyta/fordjupning.html 4th of 
November 2008. 
116 Proposal on a 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of the 
registered office of limited companies. 
117 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
118 Ibid. Art. 3.  
119 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (SE). 
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the proposal was made. A European company can move its registered seat 
from one Member State to another without having to dissolve in the first 
one120, meaning that it will keep its legal status after the transfer. The 
purpose of the European company is to create a unified European public 
limited-liability company form in order to facilitate economic cross-border 
activity.121
 
The European company may only be formed by already existing national 
legal persons122 but is at the moment the only company form within the EU 
that can move its registered seat without being wound up or losing its legal 
personality.123
 
The rules of the Regulation124are often considered as very complex and 
often refer to national law and that has the consequence that the European 
company form is not uniform but instead characterized by the Member State 
in which the registered seat of the company is situated.125 The Regulation 
set up rules on how to conduct the activity but the daily activity is still 
governed by national law. Another problem is the lack of supranational tax 
legislation. A European company has to pay tax in, and in accordance with 
the laws of, the Member States in which it conducts activity. 126  
 
One of the clear benefits with the European company form is that European 
companies can transfer their registered seats. Nonetheless, I am dubious to 
what extent, and nothing in the Regulation127 indicates that, the European 
company form is the solution of the problems concerning company transfer, 
however, it is one step forward in the process of creating a common inner 
market. 
7.4 The 14th Company Law Directive 
As made clear in the previous pages, a company’s right to freedom of 
establishment is limited by the ECJ case law and the collision between the 
real seat theory and the incorporation theory. Only a few Member States 
admit a company to change nationality while still keeping its original legal 
identity.128   
                                                 
120 Ibid. Art 8.  
121 Werlauff, E, SE-selskabet -  det europaeiske aktieselskab, p 112.  
122 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (SE), Art. 2.  
123 Ibid. Art 8. para 1. 
124 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (SE). 
125 Dejmek, P, Den europeiska bolagsrätten – igår, idag och imorgon. En analys av de 
senaste utvecklingen med särskild tonvikt på direktivet om offentliga företagsuppköp, p 603. 
126 Goulet, K, Europabolaget, p 311 et seq. 
127 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European 
company (SE). 
128 Engsig Sørensen, K and Neville, M, Selskabers nationalitetsskifte, p 37. 
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Among the proposals on Directives the Commission has been working on 
the 14th Directive on Company law129, which, would it come into effect, will 
make it possible for companies to transfer their registered seat from one 
State to another without dissolving in the first State.  The 14th Company law 
Directive contains rules designed to protect the stakeholders in the company 
from the consequences, discussed in the previous chapters, that might come 
with the possibility to re-incorporate. In practice, these rules might make a 
transfer of a company’s registered seat a complicated procedure130, but 
nonetheless, they would make such a transfer possible. 
 
The 14th Company law Directive has not been adopted because the Member 
States have been divided on the issue of employee participation and tax 
consequences.131  
 
Today, I would say, the future of the 14th Company law Directive is 
depending on the outcome in the Cartesio case132. Would the ECJ rule 
making re-incorporation possible and in the judgement specify what 
restrictions will be applicable, the 14th Company law Directive, as drafted 
today, will be superfluous. Amendments will then be necessary and there is 
even the possibility that there will be no need whatsoever for the 14th 
Company law Directive. Would the ECJ rule in a way creating a status quo 
in the field of re-incorporation I am of the opinion, that, at some point, it 
will be necessary to adopt the 14th Company law Directive, consolidated or 
as drafted today. 
 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks on the 
Harmonisation of Company Law 
As shown above, harmonisation is taking place in various areas in EU 
company law. Two specific legal entities, the European Company and the 
EEIG, both existing based upon EC law, are allowed to change the 
applicable law without losing their legal identity.  
 
So far, I would say, the most significant step towards harmonisation and the 
freedom to freely choose applicable law has been the approval of the 10th 
Company law directive. The 10th Company law Directive prohibits the State 
of incorporation of a merging company to impose obstacles on such mergers 
and provides a framework regulation for the proceedings of that merger. The 
10th Company law Directive and the European company-Regulation and 
EEIG-Regulation provide legal means for companies to transfer their 
registered office and change company law without being liquidated in the 
                                                 
129 Proposal on a 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of the registered 
office of limited companies (further referred to as the 14th Company law Directive). 
130 Person, L, Kan aktiebolag flytta? p 103. 
131 Neville, M and Ensig Sørensen, K, Selskabers nationalitetsskifte, p 52.  
132 C-210/06 Cartesio Okotaó és Szolgáltató Betti Társaság, case pending. 
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State of origin and later having to establish yet again in the State of arrival. 
Together they create extended possibilities for companies wishing to 
exercise their right to freedom of establishment, however, they do not 
provide a solution to the issue regarding the freedom of establishment 
granted by Art 43 and 48. They provide the possibility to fully exercise this 
right only by mergers or by re-establishing under new company form. A 
company, incorporated under the law of a Member State, not willing to 
merge or adjust to another company form, wishing to transfer its registered 
seat to a Member State other than that of its origin and thereby change 
applicable national law without being wound-up in the first State is today 
left without options.   
 
Even if harmonisation is taking place, it is doing so slowly, since Member 
States are unwilling, given their long tradition of independence, to 
relinquish their lawmaking autonomy in this area.  
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8 Analysis and Conclusion 
8.1 Analysis 
Many problems related to the transfer from one Member State to another, of 
a company’s registered seat originate in the divergence between the use of 
the real seat theory and the incorporation theory within the EU. Companies 
wishing to transfer their registered seat between Member States run the risk 
of being dissolved in the State of origin, of losing its legal subjectivity 
and/or the risk of having to re-establish in the State of arrival. This 
constitutes a hindrance to the freedom of establishment granted to 
companies by Art 43 and 48.  
 
As has been shown, it is not possible for Member States to refuse the 
recognition of a company incorporated under the national law of another 
Member State. Nor is it possible, without breach of Art 43 and 48, to refuse 
the establishment of a branch, agency or undertaking of such a company. A 
State of arrival wishing to hinder companies from establishing in its territory 
is left with narrow options, stemming from only a few exceptions from the 
general rule granting the right of freedom of establishment, while the State 
of origin freely can place limitations on the emigration of companies, which 
creates a rather controversial legal situation. On the one hand the freedom of 
establishment is fiercely protected by not letting Member States hinder the 
entrance to their market, while on the other hand restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment are fully allowed by letting Member States hinder the exit 
from their market. The reason to why seems to be a fear of a race to the 
bottom, with undermining of company laws as a consequence, should 
freedom of establishment be possible without restriction. 
 
So far, the controversy of striving towards a common inner market while 
having two theories applicable to the same phenomenon has not been 
solved. The ECJ has delivered rulings, which legal scholars mean, speak in 
favour of the use of the incorporation theory. I am willing to agree, that even 
if the real seat theory is still, to some extent, in use, a tendency towards the 
sole use of the incorporation theory can be seen, both in the rulings of the 
ECJ and in the legal debate. 
 
Before the ruling in the Centros case, the widespread application of the real 
seat theory severely restricted the possibilities for companies to forum shop. 
Today, which can be the most important conclusion drawn from the 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art  cases, it is possible on the 
incorporation of new companies and on the setting up of secondary 
establishments to freely choose to establish under the company law most 
suitable. It is immaterial whether the economic activity of the company is 
conducted in the State of origin or not, just as it is immaterial if the 
management seat is located in the Member State where the branch is located 
and not the State of origin.  
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I do believe, that even if many Member States, such as for example 
Germany, are unwilling to give up their traditional use of the real seat 
theory, Community law has in many cases forced, and will keep forcing, 
them to do so. If this is the case or not is debated, clear is that, so far, the 
ECJ has left the question on what theory to apply – the incorporation theory 
or the real seat theory, without an answer.  
 
It has been shown that the ECJ has given a wide interpretation to Art 43 and 
48, nonetheless there are still uncertainties regarding what can be considered 
as acceptable restrictions on the purview of the Articles. The ECJ has been 
very moderate in accepting deviation from the freedom of establishment. It 
can be read from ECJ case law that restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment can be justified only by Art 46 or in accordance with the 
doctrine of overriding reasons relating to the public interest. However, the 
ECJ has repeatedly given, as regards the trial of proportionality and 
efficiency in connection with overriding reasons relating to the pubic 
interest, strict interpretations and thus it is uncertain if and how these 
exceptions can be applied. Member States are allowed to take measures 
against a company if, and only if, it can be shown in an individual case, that 
the company is acting fraudulent or abusive in order to circumvent the rules 
on freedom of establishment. So far, it has not been clarified by the ECJ 
what actions can be considered as fraudulent and abusive.   
 
Although the freedom of establishment is a strong fundamental right it is not 
an unrestricted right – the problem of transferring the registered seat of a 
company has yet not been solved. If it does not follow from national law, 
which is very rare, a company cannot transfer its registered seat from one 
Member State to another. Legal scholars have expressed a concern that with 
possibilities to forum shop come the incentive for Member States to 
compete with each other creating more lenient company laws, in order to 
attract as many companies as possible. In the USA this has initiated a 
discussion that re-incorporation often has the consequence that the interests 
of the shareholders are overlooked, since it is likely that founders and 
directors of companies choose to re-incorporate in the state with, according 
to them, most beneficial company laws. As long as re-incorporation is not 
possible within the EU it is possible for shareholders to choose if they wish 
to invest in a company having its registered seat in a specific Member State 
or not, without running the risk that the registered seat of the company 
would be transferred and change regulatory base. Shareholders are, as the 
situation looks today, nonetheless not protected from the scenario where the 
State of origin changes its laws.  
 
I, however, together with opposition legal scholars, find telling evidence 
that a Delaware-effect within the EU is not likely to happen. Would 
nevertheless a competition between the Member States begin it will not be 
of the same calibre as in the USA, since the differences between the USA 
and the EU are numerous. As mentioned, which is the most evident 
difference, it is not possible to re-incorporate a company in a Member State 
other than that of the company’s origin. It is however, possible to forum 
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shop when incorporating new companies or setting up agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries and so far, Member States has not begun a fierce competition. If 
the current legal situation does not change, I do not see anything speaking 
for such a competition to begin. Would the pending Cartesio case, or any 
other case Directive or Regulation, make re-incorporation possible the 
incentives for Member States to compete are still not as strong as the 
reasons to why states in the USA entered into competition. In the USA, 
unlike in the EU, it is possible for the states to impose a franchise tax on 
companies incorporated in that state. Neither is it  possible, lawfully, within 
the EU to charge any kind of incorporation fee on companies wishing to 
incorporate under the laws of a Member State. The income in form of 
company tax and the increased work opportunities may be incentives for 
Member States to enter into competition. In spite of these two important 
factors the Member States may still be reluctant to compete due to the 
traditional stakeholder perspective within the EU, the interest of all 
stakeholders in a company is of equal interest and value of protection.  
Within the EU there is also lack amongst the Member States of acting as a 
Union, it is positive to be part of the EU and benefit from it, but Member 
States are primarily acting in their own interests and are reluctant to change 
their national laws. 
 
Further, in order for a Delaware-effect within the EU to take place it is 
necessary that company founders and directors are willing to use the 
possibility to forum shop. Lenient tax legislation and advantageous 
company laws will most likely have that effect, nonetheless the different 
languages and cultures and the difficulties and costs combined with 
establishing in a country other than that of ones origin, may impede the 
development of forum shopping. Though, I would say, forum shopping 
comes with more benefits than disadvantages and as the freedom of 
establishment has been given a wider interpretation more founders and 
directors of companies are willing to seek outside their national borders 
when establishing or setting up branches, agencies or undertakings. 
 
Not to disregard, however, is that not every company in the USA is 
incorporated under the laws of Delaware, despite the fact that Delaware has 
the most beneficial company laws and efficient administration institutions. 
All companies are not involved in activities or transactions that benefit from 
a corporation or re-incorporation in Delaware and the situation would 
become the same in the EU. Should regulatory competition begin to take 
place, hence, in one way or another, the market would regulate itself. The 
conditions and laws differ between the Member States and even if one 
Member State would have very beneficial laws and regulations those laws 
and regulations, as well as other conditions, would not suit every company. 
This is provided that a Member State does not choose to form its company 
law in the same way as an individual contract, without mandatory rules and 
easy to adjust to the different needs and structures of companies, in such a 
case this would create a haven for companies wishing to incorporate.  
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As has been shown, there is a limited possibility that Member States will 
engage in regulatory competition. Entering the EU meant entering a long-
term non-competition agreement as regards company lawmaking. I do 
believe that, due to scant harmonisation of company laws, the company laws 
of the different Member States differ and forum shopping is taking, and will 
continue to take place, but this does not necessarily lead to a race to the 
bottom. The general negative view on regulatory competition between the 
Member States, in combination with insufficient incitements to enter 
competition, will likely have the effect that Member States will not start a 
fierce competition in the field of company lawmaking, which diminishes the 
potential for a Delaware-effect to occur within the EU. 
 
A company law harmonisation process has been and is taking place within 
the EU in order to facilitate company cross-border activity. It is evident that 
there is a need of being able to transfer companies between Member States, 
but none of the steps taken in the harmonisation process seems to be the 
solution to the problem. The EEIG has the form of a non-profit-making 
association, the 10th Company Law Directive only provides a possibility to 
transfer for companies willing to merge and the European Company form is 
complex due to the lack of supranational company law and tax legislation, 
the various rules applying to the European Companies are as many as there 
are Member States.  
 
Would the 14th Company law Directive be adopted, it would be an important 
step in the harmonisation process toward a common inner market. A 
judgement from the ECJ in accordance with the opinion of the Advocate 
General in the Cartesio case would have the same effect – that companies 
will be able to transfer their registered seat between Member States. If it will 
be the one or the other that makes re-incorporation possible is of lesser 
interest to this thesis. It is worth mentioning though, that would it be the 
latter, I am of the opinion, that, it should be followed by the adoption of the 
14th Company Law Directive, to provide, inter alia, a protection for 
company stakeholders and to reach harmonisation and make sure that all 
Member States act equally. However, so far, the process of company law 
harmonisation has not been very rapid or successful and consequently, today 
there is room for competition in numerous areas and this makes me doubt 
whether the ECJ will judge “in favour of” re-incorporation or not. At the 
same time, there seems to be somewhat a consensus among great part of 
legal scholars, saying that it is time for a change, and I do agree. In order for 
EU to become competitive and be looked upon by the rest of the great 
powers as unified, it is necessary that a common inner market is created to 
its full extent.  
8.2 Conclusion 
This thesis has shown that, following recent decisions taken by the ECJ on 
freedom of establishment, forum shopping at the time of incorporation of 
new companies and at the time of setting up branches, agencies and 
undertakings is taking place. So far, this has not had the consequence that 
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Member States has entered into regulatory competition in the field of 
company lawmaking. By this is not said that regulatory competition does 
not take place. For example, some Member States have lowered the 
minimum share capital for certain limited liability companies and even if the 
purpose of the new company forms has been to promote the start-up of 
small and medium size companies and not to enter into a competition to 
attract more companies, the latter may be a natural consequence. Not only 
nationals of those Member States are entitled to benefit from being able to 
use those company forms, but also nationals of other Member States, 
anything else would be discriminating and a breach of Community law. 
Thus, even if the explicit purpose has not been to enter into regulatory 
competition, it can, should other Member States follow the same example, 
become an indirect effect.  
 
The UK has initiated a company law reform process with the outspoken 
purpose of attracting more companies to incorporate under the laws of the 
UK. Whether this company law reform will have that effect or not is 
premature to say, just as it is premature to say whether other Member States 
will follow. Today, no actions taken by Member States show the intention to 
enter into regulatory competition and I do believe that as long as the 
harmonisation process will proceed the negative view amongst Member 
States on regulatory competition will remain, if nothing else, harmonisation 
is one way to prevent a race to the bottom. 
 
Even if Member States are not competing to attract companies, it is 
unambiguous that founders of companies and companies do forum shop. It 
is uncertain to what extent the forum shopping takes place, but according to 
what has been laid down in this thesis the number of cases where founders 
of companies choose to establish in their State of domicile are far more 
numerous than when they choose to benefit from the possibilities of forum 
shopping. This, however, does not make the last-mentioned cases 
insignificant.  
 
As the EU today might be facing a change, where re-incorporation may 
become possible, legal scholars have debated whether the forum shopping 
would increase drastically and if it would have the consequence that 
Member States would initiate regulatory competition.  
 
Founders of companies in the USA often choose to set up their company 
under the laws of the state where their adminstrative seat will be situated 
and if the company becomes successful they later choose to re-incorporate, 
i.e. move their registered seat. By doing so they do not have to pay the 
franschise tax in Delaware or any other state granting favourable conditions 
and take the risk that the business will not thrive. By the time they re-
incorporate the benefits of the advantagoeus legislation outweigh the costs 
of re-incorporation. Would re-incorporation become possible within the EU 
this is, in my opinion a possible development. With establishing a company 
comes expenses. In order to save the expenses on legal investigations on 
where it is most profitable for that company in particular to establish and to 
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minimise the risk of unsuccessful business, due to language barriers and 
poor knowledge of the internal market within a foreign State, it is possible 
that many founders choose to establish in their State of domicile and when 
the company is sufficiently prominent they seek to transfer the registered 
seat of the company to a more beneficial Member State.  
Would re-incorporation become possible a feasible development is that the 
founders that today choose to incorporate under the laws of a Member State 
other than that of their domicile will instead of taking a risk at an early stage 
in the development of the company choose to incorporate in the State of 
their domicile and later re-incorporate in a State with more beneficial laws. 
 
Even if the possibilities to forum shop increase with the possibility to re-
incorporate, the same obstacles, that are not present within the USA, will 
remain. The caution that we see amongst companies today will not 
disappear due to the fact that re-incorporation is possible, meaning that in 
the EU, we might not see as drastic rise, as could be seen in the USA in the 
1920´s, in the number of cases where companies will choose to re-
incorporate. However, in my opininion, the forum shopping will, 
nonetheless, most likely increase along with the globalisation.  
 
On the other hand, it is not the forum shopping that legal scholars are 
fearing, but the race to the bottom, i. e. regulatory competition with the 
effect that company laws within the Member States become undermined. 
Even if forum shopping and regulatory competition go hand in hand, 
regulatory competition does not seem to be in the interest of the Member 
States, regardless of the fact that there is a wish amongst company founders 
and companies to forum shop. Forum shopping is happening without 
regulatory competition taking place, due to the fact that the Member States 
have different company laws and different basic conditions for the various 
branches of industries. Would re-incorporation become possible, I believe 
that there would be a status quo in the reluctance of Member States to enter 
into regulatory competition and forum shopping would have to take place, 
as it has done as to this day, between the existing laws of the Member 
States.  
 
The only risk, as I see it, with re-incorporation becoming possible, would be 
if one Member State would find the incentives for entering into regulatory 
competition sufficient enough to actually do so. If the UK law reform or if 
any other Member State will start a company law reform process that 
actually will have that effect remains to be seen, but would that be the case 
this could have the consequence that other Member States will be indirectly 
forced to do the same, but, from my point of view, this thesis has put 
forward strong arguments showing that stakeholder protection, as well as 
the lack of direct sources of revenue connected with company incorporation 
in combination with the EU non-competition perpspective on lawmaking are 
factors likely to keep Member States from entering into regulatory 
competition. Further, I am of the opinion, that would Member States 
nevertheless choose to enter into regulatory competition, this thesis has 
shown that, the differences between the USA and the EU are so 
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fundamental, that such a competition would be less intense in the EU than in 
the USA. Due to the differences it is important to be aware of the fact that 
the problems that need to be addressed in connection with regulatory 
competition taking place in the EU differ from those connected with 
regulatory competition in the USA, regardless of on what level that 
regulatory competition will take place. 
 
The harmonisation of company laws in the EU has not been very efficient 
and it is hard to predict whether it will have an impact on a the future, where 
re-incorporation might become possible.  
 
I find what has been argued above, in combination with the ongoing 
harmonisation process to be incentives pointing towards a future where, as 
long as full harmonisation has not been reached, forum shopping will take 
place among the existing laws of the Member States. As long as full 
harmonisation is not reached and forum shopping takes place the possibility 
that Member States will enter into competition in the field of company law 
making will always exist. We will however, not see a regulatory 
competition as fierce as that in the USA, will it exist at all. 
 
I do believe, that EU is ready for a change  and that we are facing a future, 
not too distant, where re-incorporation will become possible. To what 
extent, Member States then will compete in company law making is 
impossible to predict, but I am of the opinion that the changes will be 
marginal and the risk that Member States will enter a race to the bottom as 
well as the risk that the feared Delaware-effect will arise within the EU are 
small, and provided that the harmonisation process will proceed I would say 
that they are both close to non-existent. 
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Appendix 
After I had finished and handed in this thesis the judgement in the Cartesio 
case was delivered. In order for the thesis to still be of relevance I decided to 
comment on the judgement and what consequences might follow. 
 
As can be read in chapter 3.5 the case concerns a company incorporated 
under the laws of and having its seat in Hungary. The decision makers of 
Cartesio wished to transfer the registered seat of the company to Italy while 
keeping the legal identity in Hungary and filed an application with the 
Hungarian Regional Court to do so. The application was rejected on the 
ground that the relevant Hungarian law did not allow a company 
incorporated in Hungary to transfer its registered seat and still retain its legal 
status.133  
 
Cartesio lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the decision of 
the Regional Court. The Court of Appeal decided to stay the proceedings 
and referred a question to the ECJ as to whether “Articles 43 EC and 48 EC 
are to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under 
which a company incorporated under the law of that Member State may not 
transfer its seat to another Member State whilst retaining its status as a 
company governed by the law of the Member State of incorporation”.134
 
The ECJ referred back to the statement in the Daily Mail case that 
companies are creatures of national law and exist only by virtue of the law 
under which they are incorporated. Further it was stated in the judgement of 
the Daily Mail case that the ECJ had taken account of the fact that the 
legislations of the Member States varies widely concerning inter alia what 
is considered as being a connecting factor between national territory and the 
incorporation of a company. National legislation also varies in respect of 
whether or not that connecting factor may be modified.135  
 
Further, the ECJ in the Cartesio case repeated the statement made in the 
Überseering case where it was clarified that the State of incorporation may 
place restrictions on the transfer of the registered seat of a company from its 
territory. In the last mentioned case the ECJ also came to the conclusion that 
the question of placing restrictions on the transfer of a company’s seat from 
a Member State cannot be solved by the rules concerning the right to 
freedom of establishment but must be dealt with by future legislation. 
Referring back to the statement made by the ECJ in the Überseering case 
the ECJ now stated that since Community law is not uniform in the matter, 
the question whether restrictions to the freedom of establishment have been 
                                                 
133 C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt para. 22 et. seq. 
134 Ibid. para. 40 (4) and para. 99. 
135 Ibid. para. 104-106. 
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placed on a company can only arise if it has been established, in the light of 
Art 48, that the company actually has the right to that freedom.136  
 
Supporting on the reasoning in the judgements in the Daily Mail, Centros, 
Überseering and Inspire Art cases, combined with the previous mentioned 
reasoning, the ECJ reached the decision that “As Community law now 
stands, Articles 43EC and 48 EC are to be interpreted as not precluding 
legislation of a Member State under which a company incorporated under 
the law of that Member State may not transfer its seat to another Member 
State whilst retaining its status as a company governed by the law of the 
Member State of incorporation.”137
 
By its judgement the ECJ yet again left the question on re-incorporation to 
be solved by future Community law and the judgement means a status quo 
in the legal situation regarding the transfer of primary establishments. Some 
may find this to be the correct solution as the Member States, as well as 
legal scholars, have not been able to reach unified opinions in the matter. I 
am indecisive whether I do agree - it is not up to the ECJ, as Community 
law stands today, to decide upon a change - or if I find the judgement to be 
an easy escape for the ECJ.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.5.1, I do agree with Advocate General Maduro, 
the Community is ready for a change. In its recent judgements the ECJ has 
shown a tendency to judge in favour of the freedom of establishment and 
case law has had the tendency of moving in direction opposite to the 
judgement in the Daily Mail case. Even if, as earlier argued, it would not be 
likely for the ECJ to distinguish complete prohibition of company 
emigration from measures making company emigration more difficult 
Advocate General Maduro made a good point regarding the proportionality 
between a complete restriction and the objective the restriction aims at 
satisfying138. By discussing the matter of proportionality the ECJ could have 
opened up for the possibility that restrictive measures on company 
emigrations would not overall be considered as justified, but showing that 
situations possibly could arise when restrictive measures on company 
emigrations would be a breach of the freedom of establishment. This would 
open up possibilities for transfers of registered seats, at the same time as not 
letting such transfers occur without restrictions.  
 
One can now reflect over the fact whether the judgement will impede the 
harmonisation process and especially the implementation of the 14th 
Company Law Directive. I am of the opinion that due to the statement “As 
Community law now stands (…)”, the harmonisation process should 
continue to take place without being hindered by the judgement in the case, 
since this statement means no actual change in the legal situation. If this will 
be the case or not is hard for me to predict, the statement can be seen as an 
                                                 
136 Ibid. para 108. et seq. 
137 Ibid. para 124.  
138 Opinion of Adevocate General Maduro in the Cartesio case, para 32 et seq. 
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argument setting back the process as well as an argument encouraging a 
change, as long as the change is made by Community lawmakers.  
 
I cannot answer if the judgement will impede the harmonisation process or 
not but in my opinion a change is still necessary and I do believe that re-
incorporation will become possible in the future. Since it is unlikely that the 
ECJ will overrule itself it is necessary that the 14th Company Law Directive, 
or a similar Law, Regulation or Directive will be adopted for this to happen. 
As discussed in chapter 7.4 the rules laid down in the 14th Company law 
Directive are complex and the Member States are still divided in the matter 
of employee participation and tax consequences. However, if the judgement 
does not mean a change in the legal situation it is likely that the 14th 
Company Law Directive will be adopted either in its present form or in a 
consolidated version, as it, according to me, is a necessary step in making 
the EU competitive in comparison to the other great powers.  
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